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Abstract. Access privileges in distributed systems can be eﬀectively
organized as a partial-order hierarchy that consists of distinct security
classes, and are often designated with certain temporal restrictions. The
time-bound hierarchical key assignment problem is to assign distinct
cryptographic keys to distinct security classes according to their privi-
leges so that users from a higher class can use their class key to derive
the keys of lower classes, and these keys are time-variant with respect
to sequentially allocated temporal units called time slots. In this pa-
per, we explore applications of time-bound hierarchical key assignment
in a wireless sensor network environment where there are a number of
resource-constrained low-cost sensor nodes. We show time-bound hierar-
chical key assignment is a promising technique for addressing multiple
aspects of sensor network security, such as data privacy protection and
impact containment under node compromise. We also present the tech-
nical challenges and indicate future research directions.
1 Introduction
1.1 Hierarchical Key Assignment for Distributed Systems
With the rapid growth and pervasive deployment of information systems, sharing
resources among multiple users over an open environment has become widespread.
Access control on user permissions is an important issue in any system that
manages distributed resources. In this paper, we consider a multilevel security
scenario, where users and data of an information system are organized into a
security hierarchy composed of m disjoint classes. A hierarchical key assignment
(KA) is to assign a distinct cryptographic key to each class so that users attached
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to any “base” class can also derive the keys of “lower” classes. As conﬁdential
data are classiﬁed into such security classes, they can be protected with respec-
tive encryption keys using a symmetric cipher, where the decryption operation
asks a user for the same encryption key so as to recover the data.
For ease of presentation, we have the classes partially ordered according to a
binary relation “”. They form a partial-order hierarchy (C,), where Cj ≺ Ci
means the clearance or security level of class Cj is lower than that of Ci, and
Cj  Ci allows for the additional case of j = i. The hierarchical KA problem
is to assign a key K to each class C, so that a user attached to her base class
Ci can use the issued Ki to derive any Kj (thus to recover the data in Cj), if
and only if Cj  Ci. The hierarchy can be mapped to a directed acyclic graph,
where each class corresponds to a vertex. A class may have multiple immediate
ancestors. For example in Fig. 1, vertex C7 has two immediate ancestors C2 and
C4. If there is a top-level class with no ancestor, and each of the rest classes has
exactly one immediate ancestor, the hierarchy representation then reduces to a
rooted tree [1].
C1
C2 C3 C4
C5 C6 C7 C8
Fig. 1. A partial-order hierarchy (C,) of m = 8 security classes. One class may
have multiple immediate ancestors (e.g., C7 ≺ C2 and C7 ≺ C4). Although there is a
top-level class C1, this graph is not a rooted tree.
1.2 Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Assignment
In many applications such as electronic archive subscription, there is a temporal
restriction so that a user is attached to her base class for only a limited period
of time (typically the subscription period) consisting of a consecutive set of time
units. Let the time dimension be discretized into even units (i.e., time slots or
intervals) t = 0, 1, · · · , z. Here the maximum index z should not be considered
as a limitation of the access control policy, because the system lifetime can be
arbitrarily large. For example, if each unit represents a minute, z = 5.256× 106
denotes 10 years. The time-bound hierarchical KA is to have the Ki of class Ci
further mapped to a volatile key ki,t, i.e., let the data categorized into class Ci at
time t be encrypted with ki,t(1 ≤ i ≤ m, 0 ≤ t ≤ z). By specifying the following,
we say a class key is instantiated with a series of session keys:
– The static Ki for Ci is only used for generating session keys {ki,t} as well as
deriving the time-invariant class key Kj of any lower class Cj ≺ Ci, but not
used directly for data encryption.
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– Only the time-variant ki,t is employed by the aforementioned symmetric
cipher for actual data protection with respect to security class Ci, from
session to session indexed by time t.
A typical application of time-bound hierarchical KA is the pay TV broadcasting,
where a service provider organizes the channels into several subscription packages
for users’ choices. For example in Fig. 1 there are four independent TV channels
C5, C6, C7, and C8, and subscription to package C3 allows for the access to two
of them (C6 and C8), while subscription to package C1 allows for all. In such
applications, a trusted central authority (CA) manages the key assignment. Upon
registration, a user authorized to her base class Ci (1 ≤ i ≤ m) for period of time
[t1 · · · t2] (0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ z) is assigned by the CA a private primitive denoted
as I(i, t1, t2). She should only be able to derive from I(i, t1, t2) the session keys
{kj,t} satisfying Cj  Ci and t1 ≤ t ≤ t2, thus only authorized to access the
data stored in Cj at time t. The session key derivation is constrained by both the
security hierarchy (C,) and the time bounds (t1 and t2), and the derived kj,t
should equal the instance of the class key Kj at time t. The CA is active only at
user registration. After the issuance of the private primitive, no private channel
exists between the CA and the user, i.e., the user should derive kj,t from only
I(i, t1, t2) and certain static public information, but with no interaction with
the CA or any other user. Interested readers can refer to [2] for a comprehensive
overview of time-bound hierarchical KA.
This work complements [2] by exploring prospect applications of time-bound
hierarchical KA in wireless sensor networks (WSNs), though in the literature
little work has been done to address this topic. The motivation stems from the
following observation. Historically, the hierarchical KA technique was introduced
to implement multilevel access control [3], which is concerned with the protec-
tion of classiﬁed data and their aggregation, dissemination, update control, etc.,
and thus can be connected to emerging distributed data acquisition systems like
WSNs. We discuss certain application scenarios in WSNs, and show how time-
bound hierarchical KA can be utilized with two case studies. The ﬁrst leverages
the hierarchical property for privacy protection, while the second leverages the
time-bound property for enhanced security. We also present the technical chal-
lenges and indicate possible future research directions.
2 Applying Time-Bound Hierarchical Key Assignment
in WSNs: General Considerations
A WSN consists of a number of sensor nodes, and is an eﬃcient approach to
delivering data from the real world to the digital world. Sensor nodes have strin-
gent resource constraints in terms of communication, computation, storage, and
energy. These limitations along with possibly harsh deployment scenarios lead
to many critical security and privacy issues.
We envision time-bound hierarchical KA to be a promising technique to meet
many security and privacy requirements in emerging wireless networks including
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WSNs. Indeed, in some cases the clearance designated to (hence cryptographic
information like I(i, t1, t2) entitled to) a sensor node can be predetermined ac-
cording to contextual information [4] after network deployment. The next section
presents such a scenario. For most WSN applications, however, it is unlikely to
obtain the context apriori; there may be no way to predetermine the nodes’
clearances. A walkaround is to preload all sensor nodes with private primitives
concerning the top-level class Ctop (if any). After deployment, each node gathers
the contextual information and decides its clearance Ci in the partial-order hier-
archy (C,); if Ci ≺ Ctop, the node “downgrades” its private primitive. This is
expected for the majority of the nodes as few (sometimes only the base station)
would remain in Ctop, but to be done within a short time interval. Here we fol-
low the assumption in [5] of introductory security at the early deployment stage:
sensor nodes are manufactured to sustain possible break-in attacks at least for a
short interval (say several seconds) when captured, and the time necessary for an
adversary to compromise a sensor node is larger than the time needed for nodes
to complete the key derivation. An example in the literature that can be accom-
modated by this framework is the location-based compromise-tolerant security
mechanism for wireless sensor networks [6], the autonomous implementation of
which preloads each node with the network master secret κ, from which the so
called location-based key can be derived.
Practical time-bound hierarchical KA schemes typically adopt a decoupled
structure [2] that can be formulated as ki,t = H(Ki, wt), where H is a one-way
hash function and wt is the instance secret enabling time constraints. The above
“downgrade” may then be done by deriving an appropriate base class key Ki
from Ktop and immediately erasing Ktop for the sake of security. For example,
in [7] an energy-eﬃcient level-based hierarchical system for secure routing is
proposed, where context-aware sensor nodes are self-organized into 4 levels after
deployment. Although therein the self-organized hierarchy is for secure routing, a
similar approach can be employed to constitute a multilevel security paradigm for
hierarchical and session-oriented WSN applications like secure data aggregation,
where time-bound hierarchical KA can be applied. The technique may also help
with role-based and/or subscription-based applications.
Applying time-bound hierarchical KA to sensor networks is of particular in-
terest due to the fact that, although there has been extensive research on cryp-
tographic key management in WSNs [8–10], little work has been done to address
such a particular topic. Some research eﬀorts such as [4] took into consideration
the hierarchical KA property, but the proposed scheme only considers time-
invariant cryptographic keys, and thus does not represent a full ﬂedged access
control solution. Note that sensor nodes may employ ciphers with relatively short
keys, and thus even simply updating the encryption keys periodically shall lead
to much improved security. Other research such as [11] claimed a dynamic key
derivation, but the paradigm is event-driven (by active revocation, in contrast
to scheduled, spontaneous, and non-interactive key expiration), and thus is far
from the perception (and beneﬁts) of time-bound KA. Moreover, in [11] the ac-
tive rekeying by the CA is based on the specious assumption that there exists
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a secure broadcast channel from the CA to all non-compromised sensor nodes,
which actually drives the work [11] into a contradictive chicken-and-egg situa-
tion. Therefore, we envision that integrating time-bound hierarchical KA with
certain WSN applications shall be an interesting and valuable research area. As
a possible direction, one of the metrics that are appropriate for evaluating a se-
curity scheme for WSNs is assurance [8]; it is an ability to disseminate diﬀerent
information at diﬀerent assurance levels to the end user. This is similar to the
multilevel security paradigm, and time-bound hierarchical KA is a prospective
approach.
Nevertheless, many pragmatic issues need to be considered. For example, usu-
ally sensor nodes are not made tamper-resistant due to cost concerns, but prac-
tical time-bound hierarchical KA schemes require tamper-resistance to thwart
collusion attacks [2]. More research eﬀorts are needed to address the problem.
Of course, these KA schemes can be adopted once technical development has
made it possible for massive production of tamper-resistant sensor nodes; actu-
ally, such tamper-resistance is already assumed in recent publications like [4, 12].
Even for the current generation of WSNs, it is possible that the network is het-
erogeneous and composed of a mix of sensor nodes with diﬀerent capabilities,
some of which are tamper-resistant. It would be interesting to apply time-bound
hierarchical KA to such a heterogeneous WSN while minimizing the impacts by
possible collusion attacks. Last, even if tamper-resistant sensor nodes are not
available currently, it is still feasible to employ time-bound hierarchical KA for
sensor networks. Next we present such a case study.
3 Case Study One: Protecting Data Privacy in Body
Sensor Networks
Many WSN applications such as health-care and automotive ones need access
control to sensed data; otherwise, attackers may easily jeopardize user privacy
(e.g., in medical solutions, or in vehicular and urban sensing networks). We take
the former for a case study, as medical solutions are considered as one of the two
application ﬁelds where WSN security and privacy are of most importance [9]
(with the other being military solutions like battleﬁeld surveillance). In hospitals
(or at home), future e-Health systems known as body sensor networks (BSNs)
will consist of low-power on-body wireless sensors attached to mobile users that
interact with an ubiquitous computing environment to monitor the health and
well-being of patients [13]. Whilst the sensors for e-Health are a reality today, the
conﬁguration and management of the multiple sensors and software components
still require considerable technical computing expertise [13]. Since physiological
data collected from BSNs are legally required to be kept private, any implemen-
tation should take the trouble to protect patients’ privacy [9, 14]. Traditional
access control policies may be diﬃcult to implement as sensor nodes have limited
capabilities for the evaluation of complex access control rules.
A BSN is an attended network composed of on-body sensors, which are hardly
subject to physical capture. Unlike a military WSN, the environment for a BSN
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is far from adversarial, and the major concern lies in privacy rather than security
against attacks. Assume it is legally required that the sensed physiological data
of each patient (referred to as a record hereinafter) be encrypted with a distinct
cryptographic key, and a patient’s record should only be accessed by his or her
attending doctor and the doctor’s direct or indirect superiors. The policy can
be enforced by encrypting the record of any patient before it is transmitted to
a central database, and this can be done by associating each patient with an
identiﬁer, and associating his or her sensors with a corresponding encryption
key. If a patient once discharged from the hospital is hospitalized again, he or
she should be regarded as a new case and associated with a new identiﬁer (and
thus a new key), as he or she may neither have the same illness nor be treated
by the same attending doctor.
The above paradigm ﬁts into the familiar problem of multilevel security, and
at ﬁrst glance may be tackled with any hierarchical KA scheme. It may seem
comparable to the access control in a corporation (or government department),
where data are usually classiﬁed into only a few classes, say “unclassiﬁed” ≺
“conﬁdential” ≺ “secret” ≺ “top-secret”. The corporation example is relatively
simple, as there are merely four classes, and all the data of the same clearance
are protected with the same class key. In the considered BSN, however, the
record of each case should be protected with a distinct encryption key, and a
large hospital may accommodate thousands of patients. Instead of how to guard
the BSN against attacks, the real challenge stems from how to eﬃciently orga-
nize the encryption keys to ensure privacy concerning a large and continuously
growing number of cases. Derivatives of the exponentiation-based Akl-Taylor
KA scheme [3], typically involving a 1-aﬀects-n problem, may not apply to a
BSN, since there are an overwhelming and growing number of classes, and thus
the exponentiations may be extremely diﬃcult to manage. On the other hand,
modern schemes based on a reference table will involve heavy cost for public stor-
age, and the maintenance of a voluminous reference table will be error-prone,
as health practitioners may have little technical computing expertise [13]. We
refer readers interested in exponentiation-based and reference-table-based KA
schemes to [2] for technical details. Herein, a preferable solution is expected to
be self-conﬁguring and self-managing with little or no user input. That is, an
eﬀective system that works out of the box is desired.
Without loss of generality, we assume the following partial-order hierarchy
in the e-Health system. Patients monitored by the BSN are directly taken care
of (i.e., treated) by attending doctors, who are mostly interns and sometimes
residents. An intern is supervised by a resident, who is in turn supervised by
a physician. At the top of the medical hierarchy is the senior physician who
supervises the physicians. Regarding the access rights to a patient’s record, the
hierarchy is “intern” ≺ “resident” ≺ “physician” ≺ “senior physician”. There
may be quite a few senior physicians in the hospital, in charge of diﬀerent (i.e.,
non-overlapping) departments respectively. As usually one patient is attended by
only one doctor (an intern or a resident), and any doctor (an intern, a resident, or
a physician) is only directly supervised by one superior (a resident, a physician, or
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a senior physician, respectively), a favorable KA solution to the medical hierarchy
could be based on a tree-like structure (recall Section 1.1), where Sandhu’s KA
scheme [1] can be employed.
In this scenario, the physiological data collected by sensors attached to a
patient are encrypted and then sent to the central database, involving the partial-
order hierarchy illustrated in Fig. 2. Assume the senior physician in a medical
department is assigned a key Ksp, and there is a pseudo-random function F for
key derivation, which maps a secret key k of a speciﬁed length and a binary
string x of arbitrary length to Fk(x) of the same length with k. Then the senior
physician can derive the key of a subordinate physician by Kp = FKsp(IDp),
where IDp is the identiﬁer of the physician. Note that in the KA scheme, only Ksp
can be chosen randomly (known as “information-theoretic”), while other keys
like Kp are derived with F (known as “computational”). Similarly, a physician
can derive the key of a subordinate resident by Kr = FKp(IDr), where IDr
is the identiﬁer of the resident. Next, a resident can derive the access key of a
subordinate intern by Ki = FKr (IDi) where IDi is the identiﬁer of the intern, and
the encryption key of the sensors attached to a patient attended by the resident
(if any) according to Kc(r) = FKr (IDc) where IDc is the case identiﬁer of the
patient. Last, an intern can derive the encryption key of the sensors attached to
an attended patient with the case identiﬁer IDc following Kc(i) = FKi(IDc).
senior physician
physician physician physician
residentresident resident
intern internintern
case case case case case
Ksp
Kp
Kr
Ki
Kc
Fig. 2. The proposed key assignment for the medical hierarchy in a certain hospital
department, where physiological data collected from a body sensor network (BSN) are
encrypted before being sent to a central database
The above scheme is depicted in Fig. 2. Each doctor in the hierarchy is as-
signed a smart device, where his or her access key (typically computed from the
superior’s key) is embedded. The key derivation can be easily implemented with
the device which only takes as input certain identiﬁers. Once a patient is hos-
pitalized, he or she is attached with sensors preloaded with the corresponding
encryption key Kc (either Kc(r) or Kc(i)). Importantly, the addition of a new
case, hence the addition of a new Kc (or other keys like Ki), does not aﬀect any
existent keys. This is an advantage over the Akl-Taylor style hierarchical KA [2],
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where adding a new class tends to be painful. When a doctor needs to access his
or her patient’s record, he or she inputs the patient’s case identiﬁer IDc (e.g.,
via RFID) and the device derives the access key Kc; if the doctor is not the
patient’s attending doctor, additional identiﬁer(s) of his or her corresponding
subordinate(s) can be input manually or automatically.
This paradigm can be improved to have better privacy protection by instanti-
ating all the class keys with time-bound session keys. It can be done by employing
the afore-mentioned structure ki,t = H(Ki, wt), where the time-variant instance
secret wt may be computed from dual hash chains [2]. For a doctor, the access
period t1 ≤ t ≤ t2 for ki,t can be constrained according to his or her tenure
(i.e., term of service in the hospital). For a sensor, irrespective of how long the
attaching patient may be hospitalized, the time bounds can simply be speciﬁed
according to the sensor’s lifetime estimated from its battery sustainment. In a
BSN, the smart device of a doctor or the sensors attached to a patient do not
necessarily need to be tamper-resistant. This is due to the attended (also legally
protected) nature of BSN, and health practitioners may not have the commer-
cial incentive to tamper with the time-bound hierarchical KA system. Last, note
the one-key-per-record policy already contributes signiﬁcantly to security and
privacy, while the adopted KA system by no means hinders healthcare workers
from on-the-spot checks of an patient in case of emergency.
4 Case Study Two: Enhancing Multicast Security
Key management is an important aspect of WSN security [8–10]. It is recently
understood that key management schemes oﬀering group or multicast abilities
are much more compatible with industry trends; based on the new tendency
in IEEE 802.15.4b and the ZigBee Enhanced standard, it is envisioned that a
purely random or pairwise key management scheme would be economically unvi-
able [10]. Unfortunately, existent multicast key management schemes (also called
rekey schemes), be they stateful (represented by [15]) or stateless (represented
by [16]), are shown [17] to be seriously challenged by the threats in a WSN: an
outside active adversary who compromises a single node could obtain not only
the current multicast key but also some or all past keys, as well as future keys if
detection and revocation are not promptly taken. Particularly, detection of node
compromise is a nontrivial task. Therefore, even the compromise of a single node
at an arbitrary time may jeopardize the entire multicast communication. This
is highly counterintuitive: the impact of just a single node compromise may not
be even worse, as it already reaches the worst case. In-depth analysis on rekey
security is beyond the scope of this paper but is referred to [15–17].
We aim at improving multicast security based on purely time-bound KA,
i.e., the security setting considered in Section I-B reduces to only one universal
class comprising all sensor nodes. Hence, instead of following traditional and
mainstream rekey schemes [15, 16] driven by group membership changes, we
secure multicast traﬃc with time-dependent session keys, thus featuring sched-
uled, spontaneous, and non-interactive key expiration. In a dynamic WSN where
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new nodes are added while old nodes perish, diﬀerent nodes have diﬀerent life
cycles. Consider a certain node entitled to the multicast session key k(t) (sim-
pliﬁed from the previous form of ki,t, as the partial-order hierarchy is absent)
for t ∈ [t1 · · · t2] ⊂ [0 · · · z], where the lower and upper time bounds can be
determined based on its scheduled deployment time (right before t1) and the es-
timated end of battery life (t2 at the most). The node is only preloaded with the
private primitive I(t1, t2). As a result, even if it is later captured, the attacker
cannot gain more session keys beyond the pre-speciﬁed time scope [t1 · · · t2].
Furthermore, if the adopted algorithm has the nice feature of memory dealloca-
tion to timely erase used cryptographic materials, the attacker can barely reveal
secret keys between t1 and the time she compromises the node.
Considering the implementation constraints for low-cost sensor nodes, an af-
fordable time-bound multicast KA scheme should be as cost-eﬃcient as possible.
In existent schemes [2], an instance secret wt based on an algebraic tool known
as the Lucas sequence seems competent for a time-bound session key; it favor-
ably impedes collusion attacks even in the absence of tamper-resistant hardware.
However, the Lucas sequence computation is prohibitive for sensor nodes of low
processing proﬁle. On the other hand, utilizing the computation-eﬃcient tech-
nique of the afore-mentioned dual hash chains to generate multicast session keys
requires nodes be protected by tamper-resistant casing; otherwise, the compro-
mise of a node with I(t1, t2) and another node with I(t3, t4) is equivalent to the
compromise of every session key k(t) for t1 ≤ t ≤ t4, where t2 can be far less
than t3. The tamper-resistant prerequisite is cost-expensive or even unrealistic
for the current generation of sensor nodes. (We notice, however, dual hash chains
are exactly adopted in [12].) In a nutshell, a sensible solution that neither in-
curs heavy computational overhead nor asks for tamper-resistant protection is
needed. Our scheme proposed below is a variant of Briscoe’s MARKS [18].
Assume there is a one-way hash function H whose output is of size 2|k(t)|. For
example, if the standard cipher AES-128 is employed for encrypting the multicast
traﬃc, a good choice for H is SHA-256. For brevity, assume the maximum time
index is z = 2h−1, where h is an integer. Then we can build a virtual binary “tree
of computational secrets” of height h employing H(·) = HL(·)‖HR(·), where HL
and HR are the left and right halves of H , respectively (thus |HL| = |HR| =
|k(t)|). The 2h leaf nodes of the binary tree are associated with the z +1 session
keys for securing the multicast. As depicted in Fig. 3, the CA randomly selects
from a key space the seed secret s1 for the root node, and applies H for z times,
to each secret si (1 ≤ i ≤ z) in the tree respectively. Hence every secret si for
2 ≤ i ≤ 2z + 1 is computational. Then the CA assigns each leaf node secret to
a session key according to k(t) = st+z+1 for 0 ≤ t ≤ z.
Upon registration, a sensor node entitled to time period [t1 · · · t2] is preloaded
with the private primitive I(t1, t2) of size O(log z). The private primitive consists
of all and only the secrets closest to the root node in the tree that exactly enable
computation of the authorized range of session keys. In [18], Briscoe presented a
very simple but eﬃcient algorithm for identifying such a minimum set of secrets.
For example in Fig. 3, a node entitled to k(t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ 8 is assigned with
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s1
s2 s3
s4 s5 s6 s7
s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15
s16 s17 s18 s19 s20 s21 s22 s23 s24 s25 s26 s27 s28 s29 s30 s31
k(0) k(1) k(2) k(3) k(4) k(5) k(6) k(7) k(8) k(9) k(10) k(11) k(12) k(13) k(14) k(15)
for i = 1, 2, …, z (=2h-1)
s2i=HL(si), s2i+1=HR(si)
for i = 0, 1, …, z
k(i) = si+z+1
Fig. 3. A “tree of computational secrets” of height h = 4 generated by a one-way hash
function H covering a system lifetime starting from 0 and ending at z = 2h − 1 = 15.
HL and HR are the left and right halves of H , respectively.
I(1, 8) = {s17, s9, s5, s24}. The leaf node secrets s17 and s24 are directly mapped
to k(1) and k(8), respectively. By applying H to the seed secret s9, the sensor
node can derive k(2) and k(3). By applying H three times, the sensor node can
derive k(4) to k(7) from s5. A sensor node only needs to derive a session key
k(t) when necessary (usually right before time t). Implementation details for the
multicast client (herein the sensor node) like smart memory deallocation and
storage/processing tradeoﬀ can be found in [18].
One may be concerned with the computation load for the CA to generate
the entire tree. Actually, the proposed scheme diﬀers slightly from MARKS in
the way the tree is generated. Instead of employing any one-to-one (typically the
rotary) function as in [18], we choose a “size-doubling” one-way hash function
H(·) = HL(·)‖HR(·), where no covert channel (as concerned in [18]) should arise.
This facilitates the tree generation, which can be eﬃciently implemented with a
standard programming language. For example, even if each time unit represents
only one minute (hence the sensor nodes only need loose time synchronization)
and the network lifetime is as long as 16 years, it is enough to specify h = 23. We
tested the scheme with C on an ordinary Lenovo ThinkPad T61 laptop powered
by the free download edition of Mandriva Linux 2009.1 i586. In our experiment,
assuming each k(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ z is 128-bit, generation of the full binary tree invoked
z = 2h − 1 = 8, 388, 607 times of the one-way hash function SHA-256, but the
overall running time turned out to be only 10.1 seconds.
Compared with mainstream multicast key management schemes [15, 16],
adopting a time-bound approach has the distinct beneﬁt of no interaction be-
tween a user and the CA (recall Section 1.2), completely avoiding rekey com-
munication overhead. This also implies no dependence on a reliable multicast
channel for rekeying, as well as intrinsic immunity to eavesdropping. In the con-
text of a WSN, the proposed scheme involving only eﬃcient processing but no
tamper-resistant requirement lends itself to improved multicast security, as the
capture at time tc of a node preloaded with I(t1, t2) may not aﬀect multicast com-
munications either before tc or after t2. Besides memory deallocation for timely
316 W.T. Zhu et al.
erasing used secrets, if upon detection of low power the sensor nodes have the
intelligence to erase unused secrets, additional security against key exposure can
be achieved. In a nutshell, even if compromise of low-cost sensor nodes may be
unavoidable, time-bound multicast KA translates into impact containment. The
philosophy is not to eliminate attacks (which is unrealistic), but to minimize the
breakage.
Finally, the above scheme can be extended to a more general case, where a
sensor node is authorized to an arbitrary set of time slots. Let T be a random
combination of any t non-overlapping periods of time: T = ∪ti=1[ti1 · · · ti2 ], where
ti1 ≤ ti2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t, and ti2 < t(i+1)1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ t − 1. (The afore-discussed
I(t1, t2) is just a special case where t = 1, i.e., T is consecutive.) Although as a
whole T appears intermittent, a sensor node still only needs to be preloaded with
the private primitive I(T) in order to access exactly any k(t) for t ∈ T ⊆ [0 · · · z].
Such a scenario regarding an arbitrarily speciﬁed set of time slots caters to cer-
tain WSN applications. For example, sensor nodes may be deployed for moni-
toring the tourism traﬃc and/or ecological environment at a local scenery spot,
but not in oﬀ-season. That is, to reduce the maintenance expense, the nodes
are scheduled for hibernation in oﬀ-season, and the monitoring is only in oper-
ation during peak season. Another example is school campus monitoring, which
is unnecessary in summer and winter vacations. These applications necessitate
time-based KA concerning an arbitrary (i.e., intermittent) set of time slots.
The data structure in Fig. 3 can still accommodate the generation of session
keys even with respect to an arbitrary set of time slots T. For example, assume
t = 3 and T = {2, 3, 8 · · ·11, 14}. A sensor node only needs to be preloaded with
I(T) = {s9, s6, s30} in Fig. 3 to derive k(2), k(3), k(8) to k(11), and k(14). This
bears much similarity to the broadcast encryption problem following the Subset-
Cover framework, particularly, the Complete Subtree Method [16], though both
the scenario (revocation of stateless receivers for digital content protection) and
the meaning of the employed data structure (a tree of information-theoretic keys
shared by a large number of potential receivers) there are completely diﬀerent.
Following the results in [16], the size of the private primitive I(T) assigned to a
sensor node is increased from O(log z) to O(r log zr ), where r = |[0 · · · z] \ T| =
z +1−|T|. In case t in T is small, |I(T)| simply reduces to O(t log z). Therefore,
adopting the tree depicted in Fig. 3 is promising for multicast KA in sensor
networks, even if the upper application has an unusual demand for intermittent
monitoring.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we addressed the problem of time-bound hierarchical key
assignment, and explored possible applications of the technique in the context
of wireless sensor network security. Due to cost considerations, some existent
time-bound hierarchical KA schemes may not be readily applicable to the cur-
rent generation of sensor nodes, which may neither aﬀord heavy computations
nor have tamper-resistant casing. More research eﬀorts are needed to develop
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eﬃcient and practical KA solutions. Nevertheless, the technique is still feasible
and preferable in a few typical applications. For example, time-bound hierarchi-
cal KA is valuable for application scenarios where the contextual information is
available for sensor nodes. The technique can be adopted in future e-Health sys-
tems for protecting patients’ privacy. A related topic, post-deployment clearance
evaluation based on context acquisition, may be a prospective direction for future
research. For another example, sensor network key management schemes that of-
fer multicast abilities are more compatible with industry trends, and time-bound
KA is an approach to improving multicast security with breakage alleviation.
Even if the group oriented upper application requires intermittent monitoring,
the technique is still promising for impact containment under node compromise.
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